Greg Detre
Tuesday, 14 May, 2002
Main theses: Principles 1-33
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para. |
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1. |
Sensible qualities are ideas |
1 |
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2. |
Two sorts of sensible things: |
3-6 |
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a) sensible qualities |
6 (from 1 & 2) |
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b) collections of sensible qualities (e.g. tables) |
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\ 3. |
Sensible things are not mind-independent (i.e. they exist in the mind of some spirit) |
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\ 4. |
There are no substances other than spirits |
7 (from 3) |
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5. |
Ideas can't be like qualities of things |
8 |
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\ 5a. |
Ideas of primary qualities can't be like those qualities |
9 (from 8) |
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6. |
Primary qualities are inconceivable without secondary; but secondary qualities are ideas, so in the mind. So primary qualities are in the mind |
10 |
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7. |
Primary qualities are perceiver-relative, so in the mind |
11-15 |
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8. |
Even if mind-independent things were possible, we have no reason to believe that they exist |
18-20 |
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9. |
The supposition that things exist outside the mind is contradictory |
22-3 |
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10. |
Ideas are inert (i.e. without causal power) |
25 |
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\ 10a. |
Sensible qualities are not causes of ideas |
(from 1 & 10) |
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\ 11. |
The cause of ideas must be a spirit |
26 (from 4 & 10) |
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12. |
Spirits are active, and have control over their imagination |
27-8 |
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13. |
But not over their ideas of sense |
29 |
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\ 14. |
Ideas of sense are produced by another spirit |
29 (from 11 & 13) |
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15. |
Ideas of sense are produced in regular sequences, i.e. Laws of Nature, the character of which is evidence that they are produced by God |
30-33 |
�Ideas are inert (i.e. without causal power)� � why???
so if you point out that Locke meant SQs to be relational powers/dispositions, does Berkeley�s argument fall flat on its face???
is this his �Master argument�??? is that his term for it???
�